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23 April 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Review of Critical Collection Problems  
Committee (CCPC) Reports

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1. Attached are extracts from two of the three reports provided by [ ] Chairman, CCPC. The reports are lengthy, comprehensive studies on the subjects covered: Intelligence Contingency Plan for the Vietnam Theater -- October 1968, The Vietnam Program Budget -- July 1970, and Intelligence Information Needs for the East Asia Area for FY 1972 - 76 -- August 1970. Of course, the bulk of the material contained in them is not pertinent to the subject at hand.

2. The first report is interesting background but is outdated and provides little of interest to us. The penultimate contains a section on "Intelligence Targets and Functions" by general subject area which logically presents an alignment of budgetary considerations for specific programs against a fairly complete target list. Attachment A contains the general statement of considerations and the target lists which, however, do not quite meet our need.

3. Attachment B, "Political, Economic, and Military Information Needs: The Indochina Situation," of the latter study zeros in on basically the same subjects as those in Attachment A. These statements of needs, however, are in more detail than those of Attachment A and view the considerations in light of national interests, including security and foreign policy objectives, and are quite similar to and compatible with the general list compiled for the Ad Hoc Committee.

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4. The review of [ ] studies reveals that there is no real conflict between the previous work of the CCPC and the Ad Hoc Committee. It would appear that a simple expedient would be to forward the requirements list, as approved by the Ad Hoc Committee, to the senior principals with a statement in the covering memorandum that the list reflects the latest thinking of the Committee members and is consistent with the August 1970 CCPC report on Intelligence Information Needs.

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Related Activities Center

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10 July 1970  
Limited Distribution

VIETNAM PROGRAM BUDGET  
NATIONAL LEVEL INTELLIGENCE EXPENDITURES  
FOR DIRECT U.S. ACTIVITIES

I. BACKGROUND

25X1 NSSM-77, dated October 1969, directed that program budgets be prepared for selected countries in which the United States has major overseas diplomatic, military, economic assistance, intelligence and information programs. In March 1970, an interagency group was formed to prepare a program budget (for FY 68-71) on U.S. [ ] activities related to Vietnam. In April 1970, the CCPC was charged with developing a national intelligence program budget as a part of this effort.

II. SCOPE

By agreement with the National Security Council Staff, the Program Budget prepared by the CCPC is limited to those U.S. intelligence activities for which tasking originates at the U.S. national level, and/or which by their special nature are of particular direct interest to Departments and Agencies in Washington. Intelligence resources directly associated with combat forces or with lower echelons of SVN government operations within Vietnam are to be covered, as appropriate, in other sections of the overall Program Budget with the information being obtained from the theater by representatives of the Defense Department.

The Intelligence Program Budget reported herein reflects costs of intelligence activities incurred in Vietnam and those costs for operations and programs conducted by U.S. overseas intelligence activities outside of Vietnam which can be attributed to the Vietnam problem. CONUS expenditures are not included, with the exception of funding for certain listed activities in Hawaii which directly support the Vietnam war effort.

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### 3. Prioritization of Needs

The ultimate aim of the Intelligence Base Plan is to determine the relative need for those facilities which will be necessary to collect and produce intelligence required to meet policy and military needs. It is clear, therefore, that some order of priorities (either explicit or implied) is necessary in listing intelligence needs. Two specific approaches to the problem of assigning priorities were examined.

a. The first approach envisioned an absolute ordering of all of the specific information needs, in which each need would have its own priority rating. While this approach would be of maximum utility to the resource planner, there were a number of problems involved which made this approach infeasible. Among these were (1) the anticipated difficulty of obtaining community agreement on such an ordering, and (2) the frequency with which such a prioritization would require revision.

b. The second approach envisioned classification of the information needs into broad categories of urgency and criticality, as described below. It was felt that this approach, while less than ideal, was both useful and practicable and it was therefore adopted. The classifications chosen are:

- I. Intelligence critical to U.S. national survival.
- II. Intelligence of critical importance to national security/interests.
- III. Intelligence of major importance to national security/interests.
- IV. Intelligence of moderate importance to national security/interests.
- V. Intelligence of some importance to national security/interests.

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c. In assigning these classifications to the statements of needs, the following factors were taken into consideration, with the greatest weight being given to the first:

- (1) The magnitude of the threat.
- (2) The present state of our information.
- (3) The impact on advancement of U.S. interests of having the desired information.

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